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Introduction
1 The madrasa (Islamic seminary) of Dar al-’Ulūm Nadwat al-’Ulama was constructed in
Lucknow in 1906 on the bank of the river Gomti in Lucknow. Nadwa (as the madrasa is
locally known) overlooks a wide swath of the city-scape of old Lucknow (qadimi lacknau)
across the river. ‘New’ Lucknow, such as the neighbourhoods of Gomti Nagar and Aliganj,
have filled in behind Nadwa as urban development has ballooned to the north and east—
effectively making Nadwa the geographical centre of this expanding provincial capital.
For many ordinary north Indians,  however,  this madrasa and the ‘traditional’  Islamic
identity it is perceived to represent seem increasingly out-of-place in the 21st century.
2 Nadwa is one of the most famous among India’s reformist madrasas, and purportedly the
country’s  largest  after  recently  surpassing  Deoband  in  student  numbers  (Zaman
2002: 160).  Its  founders envisioned an institution that would bring traditional  Islamic
learning into the modern world.  Their hope in this regard was twofold.  First,  Nadwa
would ‘synthesize the profitable past with the useful modern’ (Moosa 2007) by training
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religious scholars (‘ulama) in the Islamic sciences combined with modern topics, such as
the English language, that would enable them to interact with the world as ambassadors.
Second,  they  imagined  that  Nadwa  would  rid  Indian  Islam  of  sectarianism  by
incorporating ‘ulama of all groups into its ‘conclave’ (nadwat). In the heady environment
of 19th century revivalism that spawned numerous Islamic movements, Nadwa’s founders
sought to unite them (Sikand 2005: 79). However, Nadwa’s leadership failed to achieve ‘as
much  reform  as  intended,’  and  most observers  view  Nadwa  today  as  nearly  as
indistinguishable from Deoband as a traditional madrasa (Zaman 2002: 72).
3 As the institution charged with preservation of Islamic tradition in India, madrasas play a
key  role  in  reproducing  Muslims’  religious  distinctiveness.  However,  many  forward-
thinking Lucknowis view Nadwa as clinging to outdated values. Recent concerns over
militancy among radical Muslim groups (while unfounded) only heightened suspicion of
Nadwa and what it symbolizes, such as in the 1995 night-time raid on Nadwa by police
hunting  for  suspected  terrorism  links  (Sikand  2005: 288–89).  The  Sachar  Committee
report (2006: 17) found substantial evidence for ‘a general acceptance of an urgent need
for  the  modernization  of  madrasas’  and  numerous  government  schemes  have  been
launched.1 India’s news media perennially publish articles repeating characterizations of
madrasas as ‘medieval’ or keeping the Muslim community in a ‘backward’ mind-set.2 This
critique  emerges  also  within  Muslim  communities  (Alam  2011: 1–3).  Imtiaz  Ahmad
(2002: 2285–7) questioned if madrasas are ‘effective as education’ at all in contemporary
India. ‘Now, times are changing. People are saying, ‘I have no use for the madrasa system,’
’ a businessman from a prominent Muslim family told me in Lucknow, ‘because [students]
study there [in madrasas] for eight years and still get no ‘service’ [jobs].’3
4 Yet despite widespread perception of their declining usefulness and refusal to modernize,
madrasas across India are increasing in number, size, and budgets. Nadwa in Lucknow now
educates nearly 4,000 students,  in addition to its dozens of affiliated branches across
India. Madrasas in India were estimated to number over 30,000 (Sikand 2005: 95; Metcalf
2007: L14134; Riaz 2008: 173) and more are being opened annually in rural areas around
Lucknow (as I observed) and elsewhere in Uttar Pradesh (Jeffrey et al. 2004). Jeffrey et al.
(2004: 36) attributed such continued growth to the increased demand among all Indians
for formal education, to increased income among rural Muslims that correspondingly
increases donations to madrasas, and of course to increasing population. In the north
Indian region that includes Uttar Pradesh and Lucknow city, 7% of all school-enrolled
Muslim students in 2002 attended a madrasa as opposed to a private or government
school  (Sachar  2006: 76),  and  since  a  vast  majority  of  madrasas  are  for  boys,  this
proportion could be as high as 10–13% of Muslim boys attending madrasas full-time (on
girls’ madrasas and their rarity, see Winkelmann 2005).5 Thousands of Indian Muslims
continue to select a full-time madrasa education over government schools.
5 The bulk of criticism has centred on madrasa education as not being useful in modern
times. By and large there is truth to assessments of madrasa schooling that identifies low
quality of instruction, lack of resources, and low educational outcomes (Metcalf 2007). Yet
the continued enrolments and even expansion of madrasas in India present a puzzle: do
students—and Muslims more generally—perceive any practical usefulness or economic
utility in a madrasa education?
6 This article illustrates how Nadwa madrasa exists  within a religious sphere that  is  a
marketplace for jobs in scholarship and ritual leadership, one that is undergirded by an
economy of national and international proportions fuelled by almsgiving. I explain how
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students perceive the madrasa as (among its other roles)  providing opportunities for
lower class Muslims, linking village youth who had few educational prospects to skills and
jobs in Lucknow’s urban economy and beyond—and to channels for fundraising from
donors in Lucknow, Delhi, and Bombay as well as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.
7 Much recent social science research has remained mired in policy-related questions of
‘modernization’ reforms of South Asian madrasas and whether these have succeeded or
failed (e.g. Hartung 2006b; Sikand 2006; Bano 2014; Malik 2007; Jhingran 2010; Basit 2012)
although  a  few  notable  studies  are  exceptions  (Sikand 2005;  Winkelmann 2005;
Metcalf 2007; Alam 2011; Moosa 2015). The approach of this article is to take a different
tack in the study of madrasas and to investigate how madrasas are already ‘modern’ and
emplaced  within  contemporary  Indian  society  and  economy.  Rather  than
‘modernization,’ I follow scholarship that has emphasized the ‘modernity of tradition’
(Rudolph  &  Rudolph 1967)  as  embodied  in  Indian  madrasas  (Metcalf 1982,  2007;
Zaman 1999, 2002; Ingram 2014).
8 Yet Nadwa’s relevance today is distinct from the role played by reformist madrasas of the
19th century in certain ways. Historical characterizations portray reformist madrasas as
having led the Indian Muslim community in a strategy of an ‘inward turn’ to address
societal problems by way of individual moral reform in Lucknow and elsewhere (Metcalf
1982: 5; Robinson 2008). This article illustrates the contemporary perspectives of Nadwa
students and ‘ulama on how madrasa education today has integrated them into society at
large and prepared them to participate in India’s modern economy. As educated religious
specialists,  Nadwa  students  gain  cultural  capital  and  translatable  skills  that  lead  to
perceived  social  mobility—a  turn  outward  and  upward  rather  than  ‘inward’  that
represents progress on intertwined indices of moral and material development conducive
to spreading Islamic ethics to the modern world.
9 In the three sections of ethnographic and interview data that follow, I discuss how Nadwa
provides free education to significant numbers of Muslim students, resulting in perceived
employment opportunities, as well as in other forms of social mobility that are highly
salient such as gains in social status and overcoming caste barriers. These data shed light
on north India’s  growing religious occupational  sector and the transferable job skills
obtained through Islamic studies. While maintaining that madrasa education stands in
need of improvement, even at elite madrasas like Nadwa, students voiced considerable
approval for the utility and value of a Nadwa education as compared to other available
options. Such student perspectives given in this article, as I discuss in the conclusions,
provide an indispensable  contribution amidst  India’s  growing public  debate over  the
value of madrasas in the contemporary, globalizing economy.
 
Table 1: Representativeness of Stratified Network Sample for Student Interviews
Type of Student Sample Institution
Scholarship recipients 64% (16/25) 60%
Senior students 36% (9/25) 33%
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Lower caste 32% (8/25) n/a
10 This article’s data stem from 18 months of anthropological fieldwork in Lucknow during
2012–13 on public perceptions of the socioeconomic conditions of Muslims and attempts
to address them. Data-gathering occurred most intensively during three months of study
in  Nadwa,  which  included  participant  observation  in student  residence  areas  during
afternoons and evenings. I also administered a structured interview questionnaire, from
which  a  portion  of  the  interview  quotes  are  drawn.  The  topical  sections  included:
students’  family  backgrounds,  prior  education,  motivations  for  enrolling  in  Nadwa,
motivations for pursuing non-madrasa or university education (if any), and future career
aspirations. I defined a sample of 25 student interviewees by using stratified, network
sampling  beginning  with  students  randomly  selected  in  two  locations:  the  first-year
hostel and the main mosque after prayers. These structured interviews—while not fully
representative in the statistical sense—comprise a stratified quota sample that gives a
proportional  snapshot of  the general  student body of  3,000 students according to (a)
socioeconomic status, i.e. scholarship-recipient versus fee-paying, (b) year, i.e. senior (last
two years of the six-year ‘alim degree) versus junior students, (c) caste, i.e. upper versus
lower caste.6 The Nadwa administration generously granted me unique permission to
administer the questionnaire but only for this sample size. Other quotations are drawn
from unstructured interviewing and ethnographic observation, as noted.
 
Free education in a time of state failure
11 Madrasas are primarily viewed as preserves of Muslim tradition, but a secondary, often
implicit theme that emerged during my research in Lucknow was their role in providing
educational services to the poor. As one senior administrator at Nadwa told me,
If your research is on welfare, madrasas are also part of that system [madaris bhi us
nizam main hein].  They feed and house many poor children and provide them with
training for later employment. For example: here at Nadwa.
Nadwa’s materials and statements by its leadership contain no mention of its role in such
‘welfare’  for  the  poor.  Indeed,  the  pride  that  Nadwa  students  have in  the  Islamic
scholarship at their institution suggests that to characterize this instruction as charity
would be disingenuous. Yet, while this view of madrasas as part of the welfare safety net
for poor Muslims was not an oft-discussed theme, it did come up occasionally. Jamal,7 a
senior Nadwa student told me, mixing English with Urdu:
Even though students expect more from Nadwa—better English and whatnot…what
[Nadwa]  is doing  is  really  good.  At  least  Nadwa  is  providing  education  free  to
students! So many students are poor—so poor that I buy them breakfast if they’ve
run out of money. These students would just go to some crappy government school
—or not go to school at all.8
Although religious education was explicitly recognized as Nadwa’s mission, it played a
role in providing free basic education of an acceptable quality. This view remained at the
forefront of both students’ and administrators’ views. As many of my contacts at Nadwa
saw  it,  the  Indian  public  (and  madrasa  students  themselves)  may  criticize  madrasa
education for its failings, but it still often remained seen as better than comparable local
government schools.
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12 Even as they complained about them, students understood why certain aspects of Nadwa
education were low-quality, such as the English instruction, or why there was a lack of
topics such as accounting and management that students might even find helpful in their
work as leaders of mosque organizations or madrasas. Nadwa had trouble recruiting or
maintaining  high-quality  instructors  with  credentials  for  such  positions,  since  other
institutions  could  pay  better  salaries.  Business  education  and  English-language  were
simply in very high demand in Lucknow. Nadwa administration had chosen to spend its
resources  elsewhere  given that  many madrasa  students  could  take  such courses  off-
campus  at  reasonable  rates,  and  many  students  affordably  did  so.  The  curriculum
generally devoted one class out of seven to non-religious subjects. For example, a third-
year  student’s  schedule  included  these  seven  classes  on  typical  day:  Qur’an,  hadith,
Islamic  jurisprudence  (fiqh),  principles  of  jurisprudence,  advanced  juridical
commentaries, Arabic literature, philosophy, and English and/or General Education (for a
full description of the Nadwa curriculum, see Sikand 2005).
13 As  a  parallel  system to  government  schools,  Nadwa and other  madrasas  operate  on
private  religious  alms-donations—not  costing  Indian  taxpayers  a  rupee—in  order  to
extend  basic  literacy,  and  advanced  literary  and  humanities  education  to  upwardly
mobile  Muslims.  Lucknow  Muslims  of  means  give  religious  charity  regularly,  as
almsgiving in Islam is not merely an act of goodwill  but is also an annual obligation
revealed in scriptures; for Sunnis, the rate is 2.5% of assets and for Shi’a it is 20% of
profits.  Through ethnographic observation and interviews in the Aminabad bazaar of
Lucknow, I gained a broadly comprehensive picture of almsgiving in the city.. A majority
of Lucknow Muslims who give Islamic charity do so primarily to madrasas, more than to
other Muslim organizations, once they have fulfilled obligations to needy relatives and
neighbours. Madrasas such as Nadwa receive the majority of their income through these
channels, fundraising locally and in major cities in India (see Taylor 2015; Jeffery et al.
 2007).
14 The administration reported to me that 60% of students receive scholarships in the form
of fee waivers and stipends, due largely to the institution’s charitably fundraised income.
Education at Nadwa is free for all students, rich or poor, as the school charges no tuition
fees. The only fees are an application fee and fees for room and board. Over half of the
students in a small sample to whom I gave the questionnaire were receiving a complete
scholarship  (wazifah) from  Nadwa  (16  of  25;  64%),  and  this  percentage  in  the
questionnaire’s stratified sample is comparable to that reported for the overall student
body (60%). The scholarship included room and board (costing 730 rupees per month,
$13), sets of clothes tailored on-campus, and a small 100 rupee stipend for ‘pocket change’
(jebi  kharch).  Two other students  (8%)  were receiving half-scholarships of  350 rupees
discount off the total. Scholarships were distributed on the basis of family need, which
was determined through an evaluation visit by a Nadwa representative to the student’s
home.
15 Zahir was a 26-year old 3rd year student at Nadwa who came from a small village near the
Nepal border and was receiving a full scholarship for his studies. He related his caste as
‘vegetable seller’ (sabzi-farosh) though his parents and uncles were farmers. His father
died when he was quite young, and as an orphaned9 boy he left his mother and enrolled in
a small village madrasa near Gorakhpur and subsequently won admittance into Nadwa. A
diminutive young man with an intense gaze, Zahir explained, ‘I began madrasa for two
reasons. First, I didn’t want to have an entirely worldly (dunyavi) education. Second, I had
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no money. They’re not supposed to take fees but many government school teachers do.’10
His older brother had already been sent to a Hindi-medium school an hour journey from
his home, which expended his uncles’ funds such that there were none left for Zahir’s
education. But Zahir refused to join manual labour or farming work, ‘Our village had
basically no literate people! There was a madrasa operating in the next village over, but
ours had no school at all. It’s a very backward [pasmandah] place.’ Capitalizing on the
opportunities  for  language  study  at  madrasas,  he  had  learned  Hindi  up  through 5th
standard and was currently energetically engaged in his Arabic studies at Nadwa. He had
won six awards in Nadwa’s speech-giving society for spoken Arabic. Throughout, he also
studied in Urdu. ‘[Nadwa] is the best madrasa in India. In others, there is only religious
studies [deeni tahlim] but here there is both,’ he explained, presumably referring to the
English classes and General Education course which covered the basics of the government
school curriculum in one class.
16 Zahir’s  case  is  representative  of  other  scholarship  students  in  terms  of  illustrating
educational opportunities afforded many of the Muslim families with sons who attend
Nadwa. The language instruction at madrasas, such as basic literacy in Hindi (taught at
the primary level in all madrasas) and the additional languages whether Urdu, Arabic (as
in Nadwa), or Persian was the most transferable credential for students’ entry into the
university  system.  Zahir  planned,  as  did  many  other  Nadwa students,  to  sit  for  the
government  exam  that  certified  madrasa  graduates  with  a  ‘matric’  (matriculation)
degree, or 10th standard equivalency.
17 The results of the stratified sample I took of the student body show the impact of Nadwa’s
free education upon social mobility for a snapshot of 25 students. Over a third (35%) of
these Nadwa students’ parents had no formal schooling. Most of that 35% had parents
who were farmers or manual labourers. Over 50% of them had parents with an education
of  12th standard  or  less. These  students  were  the  first  in  their  family  to  receive  an
education above Post-Matric (12th standard; i.e. finishing secondary school).  Nearly all
Nadwa students, despite their often humble origins, would soon be proud holders of a BA
or MA degrees, obtained through simply sitting for equivalency credentialing exams once
they finished Nadwa’s ‘alim (BA) or faziliat (MA) courses.
18 North Indians, particularly those from lower classes and castes, embrace education as a
means to social mobility and even fetishize schooling for its cultural capital and apparent
role in ‘development’ (Jeffrey et al. 2008). The Constitution of India guarantees education
as a right free of  cost  for all  children provided—at a minimum—by the government.
Unfortunately, the continuing educational value of madrasas is very much a result of the
massive failure of the Indian government to provide basic education. As Corbridge et al. 
(2013: 53) wrote, ‘The Indian state’s failure to satisfy this Directive [of the Constitutional
right to education] is perhaps the most damning of its failures in the post-Independence
period’ of all the state’s efforts at development for the nation.
19 The demand for education in India has simply been too vast to be met by government and
private institutions. ‘[Indian] madrasas exist in a larger ecology of educational provision
in which education over all, and particularly rural education, has been sadly deficient’
(Metcalf 2007: L1514). Over 30 million children are out of school nationwide, the highest
absolute number of any country in the world, and Muslims make up a proportionally
lower amount of graduates—comprising 11% of the population over 20 but only 6% of
higher education graduates (Riaz 2008: 164–66). Moreover, the liberalization of the Indian
economy in  the  late  1990s  strongly  impacted  education,  as  the  government  granted
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massive numbers of certifications to private schools and universities that now make up
the majority of educational institutions in cities and towns, even as government spending
dropped (Gupta 2011: 29–31). This shift is part of a larger trend, as India’s government
increasingly defers responsibility for welfare services from public to private domains
(Dreze & Sen 1995; Harriss-White 2003: 41–44). However, despite the gains that private
educational entrepreneurs have made in opening new private schools, their profit-driven
motive and fee-based structure essentially shut out lower-income students from such
opportunities (Jeffery et al. 2005). High-quality private schools were also rare in Muslim
areas of Lucknow (cf. Metcalf 2007: L1514), and the ones that I visited were of very low
quality and I heard numerous stories of corruption.
 
Employment prospects
20 A  majority  of  graduates  aspired  to  religious  occupations.  Jamal,  whose  grandfather,
uncles, and some cousins were Nadwa graduates, related to me his experience:
Government schools  here are crap.  You learn virtually  nothing there.  My uncle
teaches at one. His students won’t get a job as anything but a rickshaw driver.
Madrasa graduates, though, they can make a minimum of at least 10,000 rupees a
month for teaching ‘tuitions’ [lessons in Urdu, Arabic, or Qur’an]. You’ll get at least
1,000 per family. Maulanas will tell you they only make 300 rupees per family to be
modest, but that’s not really true—most pay more and everyone knows it.
‘Alims [madrasa graduates, pl. ‘ulama] can always get jobs. There are new mosques
being built all the time. Look around Lucknow and you can see them. The prior ‘alim
is often moving out as the imam of the mosque to other things—to go get a BA, to
teach in a new Islamic school, or teach in a madrasa—so there’s jobs.11
Being the imam of a mosque certainly did not pay well, being based largely on donations
from  the  community  board  of  the  mosque  and  collections  at  Friday  congregational
prayers when a box or bag was passed around the rows of worshipers. Nevertheless, it
was seen as a very stable job with a regular—if fluctuating—income. As I had observed
myself,  in  addition  to  hearing  from  Jamal  and  all  other  interviewees,  many  imams
supplemented their mosque-income with private tuitions for wealthy Muslim families
who wanted their children to learn the Qur’an and Urdu script at home, even as they
attended private English-medium schools during the day. Religious occupations, as Jamal
related,  were  constantly  opening  up  especially  in  urban  areas.  Another  interviewee,
Ehsan, confirmed this view of his class fellows:
People from Bihar [from humble backgrounds], they study here only to get earnings
[afterward]!  They  are  so  brilliant.  They  work  so  hard…They  don’t  have  much
money,  not  even  enough  for  continuing  studies.  That’s  why  they  came  to  the
madrasa in the first place, because everything was paid for. Even if they don’t do
well in their studies, they at least will receive a job at a mosque.12
In the view of  these students,  and their  families that supported their entry into the
madrasa, Nadwa graduates were essentially guaranteed employment of some sort—which
was not a sure thing in the economy at large, as urban unemployment hovered around
29% in UP (NSS 2013: 277). Students who worked particularly hard could rise to teach in
prestigious madrasas like Nadwa, or even pursue further Islamic education abroad in
Egypt or Saudi Arabia, while even the most mediocre student believed they would have
little  trouble  securing  work  at  one  of  the  numerous  mosques  in  big  cities  such  as
Lucknow.
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21 As with the above student, many students at Nadwa compared the types of jobs that a
madrasa graduate would likely obtain with those of graduates of government schools who
remained barely  literate.  Unlike  thousands  of  other secondary school  graduates  that
pursued  low-skilled  work  in  north  India’s  supply-heavy  labour  market,  madrasa
graduates  could  claim  a  specialized  niche.  Even  though  in  Lucknow  elite  madrasa
students such as Nadwa graduates were in the most demand, occupational opportunities
in the religious sector in India overall do seem to be growing nearly as quickly as the pool
of  madrasa  graduates,  even  as  the  Indian  economy  modernizes  and  globalizes.  A
discourse analysis of education narratives in a western region of UP uncovered steady, if
low,13 levels  of  popularity  for  religious  occupations  for  youth educated in  madrasas.
‘Interviews  suggest  that  this  form of  work  is  becoming  more  popular’  (Jeffrey  et al.
2004: 93).
22 Moreover, occupations in the urban Islamic sector were in fact perceived by Muslims as
more ‘modern’ than the village-based occupations, as the growth of mosques in recent
decades has created a remarkable rise in urban-based opportunities for youth whose
primary goal  is  to migrate from home districts.  This  view was common even among
students, such as Zahir above, who had obtained non-madrasa credentials already but
nevertheless aimed to teach in a madrasa himself,  albeit  preferring to start his own.
Research by Jeffrey et al. (2004: 974) uncovered similar sentiments among Muslim youth
in  Bijnor,  many of  whom ‘saw nothing shameful  about having collected mainstream
qualifications and wanting to do religious work.’ Unlike agriculture, daily wage labour
and  other  manual  work,  religious  occupations  were  viewed  as  respectable  jobs  that
evidenced an individual’s social standing as an educated person and their capacity for
academic learning, even if they had only attended a madrasa (Jeffrey et al. 2004: 974).
23 While at  a minimum all  students knew they could avoid manual labour and join the
educated classes as the prayer leader in a mosque or teacher at a madrasa, they often
hoped they could become university-educated professionals. As one student put it, ‘Every
Nadwa graduate who really works hard, at a minimum, can get a job as a translator,’
referring to the vibrant printing enterprises that distributed books in English,  Hindi,
Urdu, Arabic,  and Persian. Muslims I  spoke with outside of Nadwa had similar views,
sharing  stories  of  Nadwa  graduates  who  worked  in  Lucknow’s  travel  agencies,
universities, for newspapers, and even as accountants in construction companies.
24 Nadwa is distinct among India’s madrasas for its long tradition of Arabic instruction,
which  opens  up  further  opportunities  for  Indian  students  (Hartung 2006).  Nadwa’s
founders designed the institution explicitly with an eye towards Arabia, claiming to even
have improved upon the outdated management and instruction in Egypt and Saudi. When
a young Moroccan student  named al-Hilali  arrived at  al-Azhar  to  study in  1917,  his
Egyptian mentor ‘described the education [in India] as being much more organized and
therefore  effective’  and counselled  him to  travel  onward to  Lucknow.  He  studied  at
Nadwa, then later taught there as the Arabic instructor (Hartung 2006: 138).
25 Today,  as  well,  this  high-quality  Arabic  instruction  at  Nadwa  makes  graduates
particularly  competitive  in  India’s  religious  economy.  In  mosques  across  India,  it  is
common practice during Friday prayers for the prayer leader (imam) to give a sermon in
Arabic, if possible. Nadwa graduates in particular, however, were distinguished by their
intensive  study  of  Arabic.  Their  lessons  included  classical  Qur’anic  Arabic,  but  also
required them to become familiar with a variety of dialectical variations: non-Islamic
Madrasas and Social Mobility in the Religious Economy: The Case of Nadwat al-...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 11 | 2015
8
Arabic poetry, conversational Arabic, formalized Arabic of the news media, and the genre
conventions  of  Arabic  sermons.  Many  Nadwi  instructors  themselves  have  lived  or
travelled in Arab nations. The classroom curriculum was supported by numerous clubs
that fostered an environment for Arabic proficiency. A speech club (an-nadi al-‘arabi) held
weekly events for students to give Arabic sermons. Students ran Arabic conversation and
study groups daily in the mosque. A student-run journal printed articles in Arabic by
students. In the dorms and administrative buildings, Arabic newspapers, magazines, and
journals were lying around for consumption; at least one I saw is printed at Nadwa and
circulated among its donors and supporters (Arab and expatriate Indian alike) in Arab
nations. Most Nadwa students in interviews, in response to my standard question about
how their home community perceived them and their Nadwa studies, cited knowledge of
Arabic as a key achievement. One said:
People respect me more when I go home now. I give sermons on Fridays. There
have been imams in my village for years, but they don’t give Arabic sermons! I am
the youngest ‘alim of all of them, and I am the one that leads tarawi [long Qur’anic
readings] and sermons. I give these sermons without preparations! They were so
impressed.  They’ll  say,  ‘Look!  This  boy grew up in this very village and is  now
giving speeches in Arabic!’
A high-quality madrasa education provides alternative tracks to employment outside of
one’s home region, even abroad in the Middle East, due to the relative demand for a small
number of Arabic speakers.14 In this regard, Nadwa provided a form of education only 
available  within  religious  schooling.  The  appeal  of  Arabic-language  and  Islamic
instruction has a pull on Muslim students and their families from all strata of society who
would not otherwise have access to such chances for travel and rarefied learning. As
such, many upper-class students gain skills in Nadwa not available at government or
private schools, and it would be a mistake to consider madrasa schooling as a tool of
social mobility only for the underprivileged.
26 Students who graduated from Nadwa with particular skill  in Arabic could make even
further use of Nadwa’s contacts, especially for international fundraising. Two preachers
that  I  knew  in  Lucknow  who  had  graduated  from  Nadwa  both  showed  me  their
fundraising materials printed in India for use when they travelled to Saudi Arabia. The
glossy  pages  between  clear  plastic  covers  and  a  spiral  binding  contained  colour
photographs of ‘modern’ madrasas for which these two graduates fundraised. One had
already  begun  construction  on  an  educational  campus  that  would  contain  separate
Islamic schools for girls and for boys that taught the government curriculum as well as
Islamic sciences from primary school through college, with additional plans for a health
clinic and dispensary.
27 Nadwa has long been known as north India’s institution most closely linked with Islamic
scholarly circles in the Arab Middle East (Hartung 2006; Zaman 2002). Dr Khalid Bin Ali al-
Ghamidi, one of the men known as Imam-e-Ka’ba (leader of the Ka’ba) who lead prayers at
Mecca’s most sacred mosque, paid a visit by invitation to Nadwa during my research in
May 2012. Students overheard him discussing a prior visit to the madrasa campus when
he had asked why the mosque was so hot, then proceeded to donate sufficient funds to
line the walls and ceiling with air conditioners (within each archway in Figure 1). Visitors
from Mecca had great respect for Nadwa and often made financial contributions to the
school, in cash, during their visits, other senior students confided. While the donations
were not large enough to constitute a significant portion of the budget, they did enable
Nadwa to make certain improvements.
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Interior of Nadwa Mosque during Night Prayers
Credit: Nihal Ahmed Khan
28 Such international ties were also sources of hope for enterprising students. Omar was one
of the tallest madrasa students at Nadwa, although still bone-thin, and he stuck out in the
crowd outside the mosque when I approached him and asked for an interview. He was a
business student who received a Bachelor of Commerce at Lucknow University before
enrolling in Nadwa, and his pedigree evidenced itself in the way he spoke and envisioned
his future, but his ultimate goal was firm:
I want to work in service to Islam [khidmat-i dīn]…and open a ‘high-tech’ madrasa.
Universities are so beautiful, with the best tiles and buildings, and we should have
more madrasas like that, because this is where the Holy Qur’an is taught!...
I’ll make a ‘proforma’ [business plan] which I can give to wealthy people. I’ll contact
partners in other cities like Mumbai and in the Emirates online to get their support.
Mostly  the  rich  madrasa  donors  are  there,  each  one  with  eighty  lakh  rupees
[$14,800] to give! There are enough alms-givers for sure. But everyone wants to see
the results [natījeh]! We will have to show results.15
Omar was correct in thinking that wealthy Muslim donors in large cities and abroad
responded to colourfully illustrated business plans and evidence-based annual reports
with ‘results’ (natījeh). He planned to print his business plan and reports in English and
Arabic that he would write himself and get checked by senior Nadwa graduates he knew.
29 Arabic language skills led many other such students to fundraise beyond India, once they
graduated from Nadwa, utilizing a linguistic talent and cultural capital not obtainable in
universities. I personally met two madrasa graduates in Lucknow who had recently begun
residential madrasas, and fundraised about $10,000 apiece from urban donors with glossy
colour reports in Urdu, English, and Arabic. While Indian ‘ulama rarely have the upfront
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resources required to travel themselves to the Middle East in order to fundraise for small
madrasas, the Arabic reports are for Muslims visiting from the Emirates or Saudi Arabia
who  occasionally  tour  Indian  madrasas,  curious  about  these  institutions  of  higher
learning whose fame they have read about in their home countries and sympathetic for
the (comparatively)  poor conditions for Indian students studying there.  For example,
instructional  texts  on  hadith  that  were  penned  by  Nadwa’s  most  famous  director,
Maulana  Sayyid  Abu’l  Hasan  ‘Ali  Nadwi  (d. 1999)  are  still  taught  in  Saudi  Arabian
seminaries and recognized as classics in the genre of hadith studies (Zaman 2002: 162).
 
Social mobility
30 Across all interviews I performed, students responded that they saw a difference in how
their families and home communities perceived them once they began their studies at
Nadwa, illustrating the potential cultural capital acquisition and social mobility resulting
from full-time madrasa study. Completing even a year of studies in Nadwa invariably
increased students’ perceptions of their own status in their communities and the world at
large. This perception of increased status was true even for higher status students (i.e.
students with relatives or peers of high socioeconomic positions in society, those who
also had completed non-madrasa schooling, and higher caste students) but the status
gains  from a  Nadwa  education  were  much  more  salient  for  students  from humbler
backgrounds.
31 One sunny day, I  met a senior student,  Wahid, for tea.  Other students rudely pushed
ahead of us in line as we reached for teacups, eliciting glares, then a sigh, from Wahid. He
confided  in  me  once  we  sat  down,  ‘Students  from  rural  [dehati]  and  poor  [gharīb]
backgrounds are taking over Nadwa. It’s not as fine [sharif] a madrasa as it used to be.’16
Putting aside  Wahid’s  haughty air,  his  remark reflected an actual  demographic  shift
occurring in the Nadwa student body. Nadwa faculty and students alike told me that in
recent decades Indians from lower societal strata were entering the madrasa in greater
numbers. Nadwa over the years has also allowed its numbers to swell (as has Deoband)
from 600 students in the 1980s to over 3,000 students today. The absolute number (and
proportion) of lower-strata students has increased.17 One senior instructor with whom I
spoke emphasized that, ‘When Nadwa began there were mostly wealthy people’s children
attending…Now, it has become more public [awāmi].’
32 Other  interviews,  however,  indicated  a  caste  dimension  to  this  demographic  shift.
Muslims in Lucknow often mention how Islam lays a strong emphasis on equality /across
racial and ethnic boundaries, and many educated Muslims would claim to me, ‘caste does
not exist among Muslims.’ As my fieldwork progressed, however, I observed occasions in
which Muslims attended to boundaries of caste-like communities, most overtly of course
in marriage arrangements (cf. Basant & Shariff 2009: 4–5). A few interviews with Nadwa
students confirmed that madrasas were, nonetheless, one institution which transcended
caste boundaries. Answering my interview question regarding an increase in perceived
social status (‘izzat, ehtarām) upon returning to his home village, Ehsan said, ‘Yes, I did
[notice increased status] because everyone sees Nadwa as a good opportunity to become a
defender of Islam. Now anyone can study in Nadwa—it’s very democratic [jomhūrī].’
33 For  example,  Asif  is  a  younger  student  from  Mewat  district,  belonging  to  the  Meo
community, who is studying on full scholarship at Nadwa, and his hometown of Mewat is
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highly  segregated  into  Hindu  and  Muslim  groups,  following  riots  during  his
grandparents’ time. The Meo community there has been designated part of the ‘Other
Backward Classes’  (OBC)  and thus eligible  for  reservations.  I  asked him my standard
interview question of what changes he perceived in how his hometown received him after
his Nadwa studies began, and his face broke into a wide smile:
First my older brother, and now me, have studied at Nadwa…There were no other
madrasa-educated people [‘alim] in the whole village!18
I asked him if he had ever led prayer in the masjid at home, where Muslims of various
caste backgrounds attend.
I didn’t used to, but I have begun to do it. The imam asked me to. He also asked me
to give the [Friday] sermons! The first time [he asked], I hesitated. I felt weird. But
[that imam] respects me in his heart. He said, ‘Give the sermon and lead prayer as
long as you are here. People will be pleased to be able to pray behind an ‘alim.
He now leads prayer in the masjid every time he returns home on break. The imam there
was not madrasa-educated but rather has merely memorized the Qur’an. Custom in north
India dictates that the man who has studied (and memorized) the most Qur’anic verses or
has the greatest  degree of  Islamic learning,  is  often designated as  the leader during
prayer times regardless of who is the sitting preacher of the mosque. Unlike caste status
or other ascribed status, scriptural learning is acquired by an individual, and thus madrasa
studies  are  consistent  with  the modern  ethos  of  individual  advancement  through
personal endeavour. As Asif’s story illustrated, in Muslim communities such as Mewat
that increasingly prize scriptural learning, lower-caste Muslims have a chance at societal
mobility  through  the  respectable  pursuit  of  madrasa  knowledge.  Those  who  pursue
studies as an ‘alim are encountering opportunities that surprise even themselves.
34 Farooq, another student from a low caste background (he refused to answer which caste)
spoke openly about Nadwa’s environment of  freedom and equality among castes and
across other social divisions. When I asked if he perceived an increase in his relatives’
pride and esteem of him, he replied:
So much so [bahut essa hai]! I’ve seen it. Actually, whoever’s child is a memorizer of
the  Qur’an  [ḥāfiẓ]  or—even  better—studies  in  a  madrasa,  they  get  respect
everywhere they go, especially for the sake of [the student’s] parents who get so
much respect from others, ‘His son is the one studying in that madrasa, getting the
religion [dīn], gaining knowledge [‘ilm]. Everyone basically wants their children to
become an ‘alim!
When I came to Nadwa—in particular—I saw that Nadwi graduates are people who
can  stand  on  any  stage  [and  give  speeches]  in  front  of  anybody,  and  in  any
language. I’ve seen many Nadwis speak and work throughout society and they gain
people’s approval.
Nadwa’s  aim  is  to  keep  Muslims  united—unity  [itehād]  is  the  goal.  There’s  no
ideological disagreement [iktalāf] here. Just as there is complete equality in Islam, I
see that equality here, too. All sects [masālak] are [represented] here. All types of
people. It’s that sort of unity.19
As Farooq’s explanations illustrate, some degree of Islamic learning is of value in rural
Muslim  families  of  his  hometown,  even  the  sort  of  learning  children  obtain  in
memorizing the Qur’an in local religious schools. Nevertheless, he also emphasized that
Nadwa (unlike some smaller or less famous madrasas) is viewed as an institution with
sufficiently high-quality instruction that individual students’ efforts are rewarded with
broad-based recognition in their communities. The mission of Nadwa to serve as a centre
of all-India Muslim leadership, moreover, keeps a certain focus on scriptural knowledge
for all  Indian Muslims,  explicitly side-lining caste or sectarian orientation.20 It  is  this
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‘unity’ that Farooq and other classmates I spoke to appreciate and benefit from, when
they perceive that their academic achievements go unhindered by prejudices they felt in
other contexts.
35 Madrasas  in  contemporary  India,  not  only  Nadwa,  can  constitute  a  key  forum  for
reworking  social  statuses  and  de-linking  them from customary  caste  hierarchies,  as
Arshad Alam has demonstrated in his study of caste groups and the politics of madrasa
leadership. ‘The importance of upward mobility is most radically felt in the symbolic
domain,’ he wrote. ‘A young boy belonging to one of the many low castes and a first-
generation learner…leading the Islamic prayer disrupts many social solidarities of the old
order…most  importantly,  caste’  (Alam  2011: 204–05).  As  the  opportunity  to  study  in
madrasas reaches more students in remote villages, and even local madrasas offer a route
to  the  elite,  nationally  renowned madrasas  with  which they  are  affiliated,  they  also
become sites of ‘low-caste Muslims’ aspirations to find a place within the textual tradition
of Islam’ (Alam 2011: 202).
36 Yet caste is by no means disappearing as a relevant cultural mark of distinction in India.
While the decline of  the hierarchical  system founded on pollution and purity is  well
underway,  castes  are increasingly seen as  more ‘horizontal’  arrangements in society.
Caste groups retain a sense of identity and solidarity through continuing mutual support
and inter-marriage,  even in cities.  Status gains by lower castes have not  made caste
irrelevant, it has merely become less of a basis for discrimination (Corbridge et al. 2013).
37 Another reason for the continuing, if not increasing, utilization of madrasa education by
Muslims  in  India is  the  status  attributed  to  the  elite  madrasas  of  India  and  their
graduates, particularly Deoband and Nadwa but also the Dar al-’Ulūm in Saharanpur and
others. Alam (2011) provides an in-depth examination of the reproduction of cultural
capital (Bourdieu 1977) in madrasa education, usefully delineating ‘social fields’ in which
such cultural capital is most salient. As one explicit marker of the salience of such societal
status, madrasa graduates continue to affix ‘Qasmi’ (signifying a Deoband pedigree) or
‘Nadwi’ after or in place of their last names, a practice that I observed even among those
graduates  who  joined  businesses  or  took  university  positions  in  Lucknow  where
presumably their madrasa credentials were not professionally relevant. This theme is also
illustrated in many of the interviews I carried out with students, even with those who




38 This  article  illustrates  how Muslim students  view madrasa  studies  as  one  credential
among  many  that  are  available  in  modern  India.  They  take  for  granted  that  the
contemporary  Lucknow  economy  is  comprised  of  highly  differentiated  divisions  of
labour,  including  growing  jobs  in  religious  occupations.  They  explicitly  reject  the
(widespread) myopic public perception that becoming a doctor or engineer is the best
path to employment in India’s diverse labour market. This religious credential is often
sufficient for achieving students’ goals in the modern economy, in the world beyond their
village and beyond the calm of madrasa walls:  it brings cultural capital among urban
educated Muslims which they lacked previously,  social  status  in their  home villages,
escape from the remnants of caste prejudice, a back-door into university education via
government credentialing exams, and Islamic learning and Arabic skills that open the
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doors  to  geographical  mobility  to  other  regions  and,  indeed,  other  countries.  While
students are certainly aware of and accept the criticisms of madrasa education, they also
believe government education to be a less effective alternative. On the other hand, fee-
based English-medium education such as in convent schools remains out of the reach of
many.  Madrasa  education  was  thus  much  more  than  merely  a  means  of  preserving
cultural identity as a religious minority. For Muslims seeking upward mobility, it was
perceived as having real economic utility in imparting some degree of white-collar career
skills and stable employment—at little or no cost to students’ families.
39 At other times,  however,  this religious credential  was insufficient for their goals and
students explicitly criticized madrasa education for many of the same reasons as policy-
makers or others who seek to reform it. Nearly all students lamented the low quality of
English instruction at Nadwa. Many sought additional MA, MBA, and PhD degrees from
universities,  even  concurrent  with  their  madrasa  studies  although this  went  against
Nadwa’s policies. Other students declared that their prior education in rural schools did
not prepare them, and Nadwa studies were a critical intermediary step for university,
which also brings BA-equivalency upon completion, and told me in detail of their plans to
gain acceptance to the Lucknow University that was tantalizingly adjacent to the grounds
of Nadwa.
40 Yet taken as a whole, these data on Nadwa emphasize its place within the economy of
Lucknow’s religious sphere that links it to wealthy Muslim donors in India and abroad to
foster channels of upward social mobility. As such, these data represent Nadwa not only
in the typically understood role of madrasas in reproducing Islamic knowledge, but also
represent the larger relationships of  exchange in which madrasas are embedded and
which they co-create. The transnational dimension of this social mobility is a critical but
as-yet  understudied  theme.  A  more  specific  focus  on  international  ties  of  Nadwa
graduates  was  outside  the  scope  of  this  research;  such  a  comprehensive  study  of
employment and fundraising opportunities  abroad awaits  its  author.  At  a  time when
madrasas  are  so  widely  debated in  Indian media  and public  discourse,  however,  the
students’ views on the religious labour market of Lucknow presented here do capture a
less studied aspect of socioeconomic development in north India, showing madrasas such
as Nadwa within a  flow of alms, wealth, and job opportunities that lower-class Muslims of
Lucknow perceive as having a substantial impact. Such a rationalization of religion has
not necessarily led to the withering away of religion from the public sphere,  as Max
Weber (1978) proposed (cf. Casanova 1994; Eickelman & Anderson 1999; Zaman 2002), but
rather to an advanced division of labour between mutually interdependent sectors and
sub-economies—including clerical occupations and religious education.
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NOTES
1. To name a few by way of example, the national government welfare schemes targeted at
madrasas  include  the  Sarva  Shiksha  Abhiyan  (SSA)  and  the  Area  Intensive  and  Madrasa
Modernization Programme, as well as more recent 2014 additions: Scheme for Providing Quality
Education in Madarsas (SPQEM), the Infrastructure Development in Minority Institutions (IDMI),
and the Maulana Azad Talim-e-Balighan (education for adults) scheme. Many state-level schemes
also exist.
2. See for example, Mohammad Wajihuddin. 2011. ‘The Price of Moderation,’ Times of India, July
31,  2011.  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/The-price-of-moderation/
articleshow/9427018.cms
3. All  quotations from interviews in this article are translated by the author from the Urdu,
unless noted as spoken in English.
4. Page numbers prefaced with an ‘L’ in citations refer to e-book Locations in the Kindle e-book
edition.
5. Madrasa attendance rates are significantly higher in north India than in other regions. The
Sachar Committee reported as follows: East 3.5%, South 1.5%, West 3.5%, and all-India 4%.
6. While official figures were not available, the caste breakdown for the institution as a whole
was estimated at less than one-third students from ‘backward’ (OBC) or dalit groups, through
conversations with the administrative officials and senior instructors.
7. All  names  of  interviewees  are  pseudonyms.  This  dialogue  was  taken  from  a  translated
interview transcript audio recorded during fieldwork. All other quotes in this article are also
from interview transcripts, unless otherwise indicated, recorded via digital audio or handwritten
fieldnotes. All quotes are in Urdu, unless otherwise noted, and were translated into English by
the author.
8. Jamal, interview by author, Lucknow, 4 April 2013. Jamal was in his final year of the ‘alim (BA-
equivalency)  course  at  Nadwa,  from  an  upper-class  family  with  many  members  educated  at
Nadwa and abroad (including himself), and from a caste in general category.
9. Children without a father are often known as ‘orphan’ (yatim) in north India, even if their
mother is still alive because she is assumed not to have earning power.
10. Zahir, interview by author, Lucknow, 28 June 2013.
11. Jamal, Interview by author, Lucknow, 4 April 2013.
12. Ehsan, interview by author, Lucknow, 3 July 2013. Ehsan’s family was upper-class, living in
Saudi Arabia for his childhood where his father was a manager for an American corporation, and
from a caste in general category (Beg/Moghul).
13. In western UP, the vast majority of respondents engaged in agricultural, artisan, or wage
labour. Equal numbers of respondents entered ‘business’ and ‘religious’ (mosque and madrasa)
employment (Jeffrey et al. 2004: 973–74).
14. The international ties and mobility were not an explicit part of my research questionnaires;
however, see Hartung (2006) on the primacy of Nadwa’s ties with the Arab region.
15. Omar,  interview  by  author,  Lucknow,  23  June  2013.  Omar  was  from  a  family  in  which
advanced university degrees were common (his father was an engineer and mother held an MA
in Islamic Studies), and was of Siddiqi/Sayyid caste.
16. Wahid, informal conversational interview, Lucknow, 6 June 2013. I did not interview Wahid
about  his  socioeconomic  or  caste  background,  but  he  is  from  a  family  with  elder  members
educated at Nadwa in prior decades.
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17. This trend is not documented in any official data, as Nadwa administration does not keep
records on the caste background of students.
18. Asif, interview by author, Lucknow, 29 June 2013. Asif’s father was an uneducated laborer.
19. Farooq, interview by author, Lucknow, 27 June 2013. Farooq was in his first year at Nadwa,
was  from  a  family  of  farmers,  and  refused  to  answer  the  caste  background  question  (the
interview carefully  addressed sensitivity  to  discussing  caste  among Muslims and encouraged
respondents to do so if they chose).
20. Of  course,  Farooq  is  speaking  of  various  Sunni  sects;  Shi’a  were  originally  included  by
Nadwa’s founders as part of their revivalist movement, but due to an early conflict, Shi’a were
subsequently excluded (Jones 2011: 56).
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